Indonesia plans to purchase 42 second-hand J-10 fighter aircraft from China and could also proceed with procurement of Russian Su-35 fighters, marking a dramatic shift in the country’s air force modernization strategy, according to sources.
Alert5, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons
An official announcement regarding both deals are anticipated during the Indo Defence Expo & Forum, scheduled to take place from June 11-14, sources familiar with the matter indicated.
The potential procurement represents a significant departure from Indonesia’s recent focus on Western alternatives and occurs amid the country’s broader strategic realignment toward China. This development comes as Indonesia positions itself as a regional power broker while managing intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China that has prompted several countries in the region to recalibrate their strategic and economic alignments.
Indonesia’s fighter modernization efforts have followed a winding path over the past decade, reflecting the complex geopolitical pressures facing Jakarta as it balances relationships with competing major powers.
The journey began in September 2015 when Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu announced plans to replace one squadron of aging F-5 Tiger aircraft with 16 Russian Su-35 fighters. The initial timeline proved overly optimistic, with the actual contract not materializing until February 2018, covering 11 aircraft rather than the originally planned 16 units. First deliveries were scheduled for October 2018 to participate in Indonesia’s annual military parade, though this timeline was never realized.
By December 2021, Indonesian Air Force Chief Marshal Fadjar Prasetyo announced the abandonment of Su-35 procurement during a media gathering at Halim Perdanakusuma Air Base. While initially attributed to budget constraints, the complete picture emerged in June 2023 when the Defense Ministry revealed that U.S. sanctions threats, rather than budget limitations, had driven the cancellation decision. The ministry specifically cited concerns about CAATSA sanctions and potential inclusion on Office of Foreign Assets Control watch lists.
Following the Su-35 abandonment, Indonesia pivoted toward Western alternatives. In February 2022, the country signed a contract with Dassault Aviation for an initial batch of Rafale fighters, with first deliveries scheduled for January 2026. This commitment expanded significantly in August 2023 when a second tranche of 18 additional Rafales entered the order backlog, bringing Indonesia’s total Rafale commitment to 24 aircraft.
The government had also planned to purchase 12 Mirage 2000-5 aircraft from Qatar as an interim solution, with delivery scheduled within 24 months to Pontianak Air Base in West Kalimantan. However, this plan was later abandoned as well.
Parallel to the Rafale commitments, Indonesia maintained active negotiations for American F-15EX fighters through U.S. Foreign Military Sales procedures, with initial discussions targeting 2027 deliveries. The F-15EX program gained momentum following high-level diplomatic engagement, including visits by then-Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin to Jakarta in November 2022 and then-Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto’s tour of Boeing’s production facility in St. Louis, Missouri.
The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency had announced in February 2022 that the possible sale of F-15EX aircraft and related equipment to Indonesia was valued at up to $13.9 billion, subject to U.S. Congress approval. Indonesian-procured F-15EX aircraft would be designated as F-15IDN.
The apparent shift toward Chinese and potentially Russian fighters occurs against the backdrop of Indonesia’s dramatically deepening relationship with China. In January 2025, Indonesia became the first Southeast Asian country to join the China-led BRICS grouping, positioning itself as a vocal advocate for greater ASEAN involvement in the bloc focused on trade, development and global governance issues.
China’s economic leverage provides crucial context for Indonesia’s evolving procurement strategy. Beijing is Indonesia’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade more than doubling from $52.45 billion in 2013 to $135.17 billion in 2024. China is also Indonesia’s top foreign investor, with investments totaling $8.1 billion in 2024 alone, according to Indonesia’s Investment Coordinating Board.
This economic relationship has been elevated to unprecedented political heights. President Prabowo Subianto’s November 2024 agreement with Chinese President Xi Jinping to build a “China-Indonesia community of destiny with regional and global influence” represents a new level of bilateral cooperation. Underscoring China’s strategic importance, Prabowo made Beijing his first overseas destination both as president-elect and within weeks of taking office.
During Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Jakarta in May 2025, Prabowo reaffirmed his vision for the China-Indonesia community of destiny with regional and global influence, stating: “I reaffirm our commitment to strengthening this partnership with the People’s Republic of China and with the Chinese people. We believe that this relationship will bring benefits not only to our two countries but to the entire Asian region, and possibly to the world,” suggesting Indonesia sees itself as a regional power broker rather than a junior partner to either the U.S. or China.
Indonesia’s air force faces pressing modernization challenges with aging aircraft approaching operational limits. Retired F-5 fighters and Hawk 100/200 trainers require replacement, while existing fleets need comprehensive upgrades and overhauls that will temporarily reduce available aircraft during maintenance periods.
The Defense Ministry has emphasized the need for rapid delivery capabilities to maintain operational readiness during fleet transitions. Both Chinese and Russian aircraft could potentially offer faster delivery timelines compared to Western alternatives, which often involve lengthy production queues and complex approval processes. The second-hand J-10 fighters will be delivered relatively quickly by drawing from the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s inventory, providing immediate capability enhancement. The J-10s will likley be modified to meet export requirements before handing over to Indonesia.
Indonesia’s selection of the J-10 gains additional significance given its recent operational experience in the conflict between India and Pakistan, where the aircraft has demonstrated its prowless by shooting down a Indian Air Force Rafale fighter using a long-range air-to-air missile.
Indonesia’s decision to procure the J-10 alongside its existing Rafale commitments would make it the first country globally to operate both fighter types simultaneously, providing unique operational insights into the comparative performance of Chinese and Western air combat systems.
Indonesia has historically maintained a diversified defense procurement approach, operating fighters from multiple suppliers including American F-16s, Russian Su-27/30s, and British Aerospace Hawks. However, the current situation would create an unprecedented level of supplier diversity, with active programs from Russian, French, and Chinese manufacturers simultaneously.
The potential addition of J-10 and Su-35 fighters to existing Rafale commitments would create significant budget and operational challenges. With 24 Rafales already committed, adding Chinese and Russian fighters would represent a massive expansion of Indonesia’s fighter modernization program. With 66 canard-delta fighters, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Udara will emerge as a powerful force in the region.
The logistics implications are equally complex. Operating Russian Su-35s alongside French Rafales and Chinese J-10s would require separate training pipelines, maintenance facilities, spare parts inventories, and weapons systems. This multi-supplier approach, while providing strategic autonomy, would significantly increase operational complexity and costs.
A decision to proceed with J-10 and Su-35 procurement would signal Indonesia’s willingness to challenge U.S. sanctions pressure in pursuit of its defense modernization objectives, even while maintaining substantial commitments to Western suppliers. The move could potentially complicate relationships with both American and French partners while strengthening ties with China and Russia.
This latest development has effectively ended Indonesia’s pursuit of the multi-billion dollar F-15EX program, representing a significant setback for U.S. defense export priorities under the Trump administration. The decision by Indonesia would impact Boeing’s plans to expand local manufacturing capabilities and supply chain integration, while potentially affecting the trajectory of the long-term Rafale partnership with Dassault Aviation.
The development occurs against a backdrop of evolving global defense markets and changing alliance structures. Indonesia’s approach reflects broader trends among middle powers seeking strategic autonomy while managing relationships with competing major powers. The country appears willing to accept the complexity and costs of operating fighters from four major suppliers simultaneously to maintain maximum strategic flexibility.
The timing of both announcements at the Indo Defence Expo would provide a high-profile platform for the decision, with international defense industry representatives and media present, potentially signaling Indonesia’s emergence as a key swing state in the Asia-Pacific’s evolving strategic landscape.