In a recent article from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists examining China’s hypersonic capabilities, attention is drawn to the country’s surprising development of a hypersonic glide vehicle combined with a fractional orbital bombardment system. The writer highlights the potential implications of this technology, particularly its ability to deliver payloads faster and more covertly than existing systems.
果壳军事, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons
The article delves into the details of China’s 2021 test, where a hypersonic glide vehicle traveled nearly 25,000 miles and reached hypersonic speeds. The combination of a hypersonic glide vehicle with a fractional orbital bombardment system raises concerns about the potential for rapid delivery of nuclear payloads from space, surpassing the limitations of traditional ballistic missiles.
By exploiting the maneuverability and unpredictability of hypersonic glide vehicles, China’s fractional orbital hypersonic delivery system poses a new challenge to strategic stability. The system’s increased speed, difficulty in tracking, and improved precision make it a formidable asset for potential first-strike capabilities.
The article also discusses the historical context of fractional orbital bombardment systems, which were previously considered impractical due to their inherent inaccuracies and the development of space-based early detection capabilities by the United States. However, when combined with hypersonic glide vehicles, these limitations are effectively overcome, leading to the reevaluation of such systems in the modern era.
Furthermore, the article addresses the growing accessibility of low Earth orbit, with an increasing number of satellites making it more challenging to track individual payloads. This expanding environment presents opportunities for fractional orbital hypersonic delivery systems to hide among other spacecraft, heightening concerns about their deployment and detection.
Despite the potential threats posed by China’s advancements, the article highlights the country’s commitment to the Outer Space Treaty and its collaborative efforts with Russia in drafting the Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) Treaty. These agreements suggest some assurance that China will not deploy weapons systems that complete multiple orbits of the Earth.
In conclusion, the analysis emphasizes the significance of China’s hypersonic developments and the potential shift they represent in global military capabilities. It calls for further examination and mathematical analysis of fractional orbital hypersonic delivery systems to understand their dynamics and implications better. The article raises crucial questions about the future of strategic stability and the necessity for continued monitoring and assessment of emerging technologies in the military realm.
For more information, hit the Source below