An F-16C Fighting Falcon, tail number 89-002023, was badly damaged in a non-flying mishap on Nov. 17, 2023 at an undisclosed location in Southwest Asia. The aircraft, assigned to the 555th Fighter Squadron, 31st Fighter Wing, Aviano Air Base, Italy, was parked and unmanned at the time of the incident. The accident, which resulted in an estimated $30,241,892.00 in damages to government property and $4,954.00 in environmental cleanup costs, was triggered by a series of events involving a runaway MJ-1 weapons loader, also known as a “jammer.”
Graphic: USAF
The incident began when a team of weapons loaders was tasked with reconfiguring the munitions load on a nearby F-15E Strike Eagle. The team consisted of a crew chief (MXLCl), a weapons loader (MXLC2), and a driver (MXLC3) operating the MJ-1. After removing several munitions from the F-15E, MXLC2 was directed by MXLCl to reposition the jammer. However, shortly after beginning to reverse the MJ-1, MXLC2 reported being unable to stop the vehicle. Despite attempting to apply the brakes and engage the parking brake, the runaway jammer continued moving backwards, striking the F-15E’s Sniper pod and pinning MXLC2 against the aircraft’s bomb rack unit.
The impact with the F-15E’s landing gear altered the jammer’s trajectory, throwing MXLC2 from the vehicle. Now unmanned, the MJ-1 continued its reverse course, striking a toolbox before ultimately colliding with the parked F-16C. The impact ruptured the F-16’s right external fuel tank, causing a fuel leak that quickly ignited upon contact with a spark from the still-running MJ-1. The resulting fire engulfed both the jammer and the F-16, completely destroying the former and causing extensive damage to the latter.
A subsequent investigation by the United States Air Force Accident Investigation Board determined that the primary cause of the accident was MXLC2’s loss of situational awareness and failure to properly apply emergency shutdown procedures. The Board determined that MXLC2 likely misjudged the distance to the F-15E and, due to his lack of recent experience operating the MJ-1, may have confused the model of jammer he was operating, leading him to mistakenly engage the accelerator pedal instead of the brake. Furthermore, MXLC2 failed to follow the prescribed emergency shutdown procedures, which included depressing the brake pedal, pushing the throttle cable all the way in, and turning the ignition off. The Board concluded that any of these actions would have stopped the MJ-1 and prevented the collision with the F-16.
Contributing to the severity of the incident was the failure of the MJ-1’s hydrostatic drive pump, which became stuck in the reverse position following the initial impact with the F-15E. This failure, in turn, prevented the jammer’s centering mechanism from returning the control lever to the neutral position and stopping the vehicle. While technical analysis of the hydrostatic drive pump indicated that it was already in a degraded condition due to severe corrosion and debris contamination, the Board determined that the impact with the F-15E likely triggered the final failure.
The Board identified two key contributing factors that played a significant role in the accident. First, inadequate maintenance documentation practices at the undisclosed location made it impossible to conclusively determine the maintenance history of the MJ-1 involved in the accident. This lack of documentation prevented timely identification and remediation of potential mechanical issues, including those related to the centering mechanism and hydrostatic drive pump. Second, a loose culture of adherence to Air Force standards and technical procedures resulted in uncompleted Time Compliance Technical Orders, improperly conducted inspections, and a general lack of attention to detail in routine maintenance practices. This contributed to the degraded condition of the MJ-1 and increased the likelihood of component failure.
The Accident Investigation Board concluded that the accident highlights the importance of maintaining rigorous maintenance documentation practices, adhering to established technical procedures, and fostering a culture of safety and attention to detail among maintenance personnel. The Board also emphasized the need for thorough training and proficiency checks for personnel operating specialized equipment, such as munitions loaders.
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Will both the F-15E and F-16C be repaired and returned to service?